On 2023 September 14, Hasan Abi and Ethan Klein argued on their show "Leftovers" about Taiwanese independence. Hasan is the most popular socialist pundit on Earth. Ethan is one of the largest social-democratic pundits on YouTube.
In the segment, Hasan defended the status quo, in which Taiwan is de facto independent. However, he inaccurately described that status quo, and gave several bad reasons to oppose Taiwanese independence.
All of this is a good excuse to write a blogpost on the topic of Taiwanese independence, which constantly comes up in socialist spaces. Most pro-China campists argue that Taiwan is "merely an internal matter" for China. This is a strong pro-unification position, at odds with reality, which most non-campists reject.
What do Taiwanese people think about independence, unification, and Chinese identity? What is the status quo? What is the "correct" socialist view on Taiwan?
The Good: Democratic Justifications
Starting at 51:05, Hasan argues that Taiwan should maintain the status quo, because it has supermajority support from Taiwanese people.
Here's the transcript:
[ETHAN] What's your opinion? [Is] Taiwan independent?
[HASAN] My opinion on Taiwan is that Taiwan is -- the Chinese concept of Taiwan should remain in the hands of the people in Taiwan, who believe --
[ETHAN] So therefore it's independent?
[HASAN] -- who, for the record, for the most part, just believe to not disrupt the ongoing relations with China.
[....]
[DAN] What Hasan said is true from everything that I've read, that most people in Taiwan nowdays support just keeping the status quo, the kind of "strategic ambiguity" of what's going on.
[HASAN] The overwhelming majority's consensus opinion is that they don't want to disrupt relations with China, and they also -- obviously, if it was a situation between full-blown independence versus becoming a Chinese state, like becoming a part of the Chinese state?
Hasan is correct. Surveys show that a stable majority of Taiwanese people -- around 60% -- support the status quo. In fact, a majority has never supported leaving the status quo. For example, here are results from the National Chengchi University's Election Study Center:
Between the 1990's and 2020's:
Support for unification (slow or immediate) fell from ~25% to ~10%
Support for independence (slow or immediate) rose from ~15% to ~30%
Support for keeping the status quo (temporarily or indefinitely) stayed between 55% and 65%
Of course, it is nearly impossible to know what people's "true" preferences would be, if the "independence" option had no threat of war behind it.
As I will discuss in the final section, this democratic supermajority is a fairly strong moral justification for supporting the legal status quo.
Both Ethan and Hasan agree that most people support the status quo -- but disagree on what that polling means, because they disagree on what the status quo is.
"Keeping the status quo" of de-facto independence means something different than "keeping the status quo" of de-facto unification. Which is true?
What is the status quo?
In short: The Republic of China (ROC), or Taiwan, conducts almost all of the typical roles of a state. Taiwanese people elect an independent parliament, which runs an independent government, which maintains a monopoly on violence and taxation. However, Taiwan has never declared independence, and it is recognized as a separate country by almost no countries. It is "de facto" independent, but not "de jure".
Starting at 55:15, Ethan agrees with Hasan about the polling, but argues that it implies that most Taiwanese people support de-facto independence:
[ETHAN] Taiwan is already independent, that's what I'm saying. People don't want a formal declaration just because they don't want a fucking war. But they're not wanting to be Hong Kong and get consumed by the Chinese Party.
[....]
[ETHAN] You say you think "the people of Taiwan, whatever they want". And it seems to me that the people of Taiwan want independence. So, I'm right there with you, brother.
[HASAN] I think, "one nation, two systems", which is the current [policy].
Hasan is wrong. "One country, two systems" (1C2S) was the official Chinese position on Hong Kong (until the 2020 security law), but has never applied to Taiwan.
Under the alleged 1992 Consensus, which the Kuomintang (KMT) reached with the People's Republic of China (PRC), which the KMT summarized as "one China, different interpretations". This is the closest that Taiwan has come to the 1C2S view.
However, the KMT are the pro-PRC "side" of Taiwanese politics, and the anti-PRC "side" of Taiwanese politics rejected this framing. In 2017, the pro- and anti-PRC "sides" of Taiwanese politics both explicitly rejected the "one country, two systems" model for Taiwan, when the KMT's leader said 1C2S had "no market" in Taiwan.
In short: When Hasan says "one China, two systems" is the current policy, he is either incorrect or misspeaking.
Hasan was not alone. Vaush, the 2nd-largest socialist pundit on Earth, also got the status quo on Taiwan wrong. (Hi, chat!) At 3:01:25, Vaush stated:
He's misrepresenting the policy of stategic ambiguity. The policy of strategic ambiguity is whether or not the United States would use its military to defend Taiwan if it was invaded by China. The US unambiguously recognizes Taiwan as a separate country.
Vaush is right that, under the US policy of strategic ambiguity on Taiwan, the US does not explicitly state whether it would or would not defend Taiwan if Taiwan were invaded by the PRC. For example, in 2021, when Biden said that the US has a "commitment" to protect Taiwan, the White House and the State Department immediately denied that the US has any legal obligation to defend Taiwan.
However, Vaush is wrong that the US "unambiguously recognizes Taiwan as a separate country". Since Nixon's 1972 visit to China, the United States has upheld the "One China" policy, in which the United States officially claims that only one China exists, the PRC rules China, and that Taiwan is part of China, but unofficially does everything it would do with Taiwan that it would do with a "normal" country.
For example, in a 2022 factsheet, the State Department stated that Taiwan was not an independent country and they do not support its independence:
The United States approach to Taiwan has remained consistent across decades and administrations. The United States has a longstanding one China policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three U.S.-China Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances. We oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side; we do not support Taiwan independence; and we expect cross-Strait differences to be resolved by peaceful means.
In fact, the policy of deliberate ambiguity (theoretically) makes both a Taiwanese declaration of independence less likely (because the US might not defend it) and PRC invasion less likely (because the US might defend Taiwan).
In short: When Vaush says the US unambiguously supports Taiwan as a separate country, he is either incorrect or misspeaking.
The Bad: Ethnic, Linguistic, and Temporal Justifications
Starting at 1:00:25, Hasan raises several bad justifications for Taiwanese non-independence:
[HASAN] Because, remember, the overwhelming majority of people living in Taiwan are still Han Chinese. Therefore, despite the fact that it's a separate country, it's still the same people, language is the same, people will say --
[ETHAN] Just like Ukraine. Ukraine belongs to Russia for that exact reason.
[HASAN] I don't think Ukraine belongs to Russia, because the Ukrainian nation-state project -- there are similarities, you're not wrong about that -- **but the Ukrainian nation-state project, as a well-defined nation state, has always -- has been around for much, much longer than Taiwan being an indepndent nation-state. **
In short, Hasan claims that [1] China and Taiwan share ethnicity and language and [2] that Taiwan's independence is young, and [3] these facts justify his preference for "one country, two systems" (1C2S).
Hasan is mostly correct on both factual claims. However, both are bad moral justifications for the semi-unification that he seems to prefer.
The first claim -- "the same people, language is the same" -- comes uncomfortably close to ethnonationalist justifications for unification. The fact that two groups of people share a genetic heritage or language does not mean that both would be better off under one government.
The second claim -- Taiwan's independence is young -- is absurd on its face. Again, the fact that two groups of people have only been separated for 74 years (rather than 200) does not mean that both would be better off under one government.
For an example of how ethnonationalist justifications fail, see the Election Survey Center's data below, which show that most Taiwanese people reject a shared political identity with Chinese people. Between 1992 and 2023:
Thoe who identified as only "Chinese" fell from 28% to 3% (-25pp)
Thoe who identified as "both Chinese and Taiwanese" fall from 52% to 32% (-20pp)
Thoe who identified as only "Taiwanese" rose from 20% to 66% (+46pp)
That's an enormous shift in opinion away from a common identity in Taiwan and China.
In short: It would be absurd to force unification on a region where 2/3 of people do not identify as part of the unifying power.
What is the "correct" leftist view on Taiwan?
The vast majority of leftists -- including myself -- strongly support some form of democracy as the best method to govern human relations and only way to run a classless society. Most leftists want truly demoratic workplaces, economies, governments, and international relations.
Because of these views, most leftists -- including myself -- support some form of "democratic self-rule", in which the people of a region should choose their leaders. Who better to decide the policies of a living place than the people who live there, of a workplace who work there?
Socialists have long supported democratic self-rule. That's why every Soviet Constitution granted the right to secede to each Soviet republic. See Article 4 in 1924, Article 17 in 1936, and Article 72 in 1977. (These articles were mostly for show.) And that's why the Soviet-Warsaw invasions of East Germany (53), Hungary (56), and Czechoslovakia (68) were so shocking to Western socialists: They blatantly violated democratic self-rule.
Similarly, Marx held a strong commitment to national self-rule. For example, after the anti-Russia 1863 January Uprising in Russia-occupied Poland, Marx organized a meeting of English and French workers in support, which led directly to the founding of the First International in 1864.
But Marx -- and most leftists -- are not absolutist believers in democratic self-rule. For example, Marx strongly opposed the Confederate States of America and worked to oppose Britain's support of the CSA, even though a majority of White, male Confederates voted to secede. What gives?
The reason is simple: The CSA seceded to worsen the conditions of its workers, because its purpose was to defend slavery. Even if secession were democratic, the Herrenvolk democracy of the US South would have held back the overall democratization of society.
In contrast, the Polish rebellion (which was led by a coalition of centrist-ish aristocrats and liberal-ish democrats fought against Imperial Russia (which was led by an undemocratic aristocrat who made some liberal concessions, such as abolishing serfdom). A post-rebellion Poland might have been better for workers than Russia-occupied-Poland -- but it certainly would have better reflected democratic self-rule.
I believe that socialists should support secession or unification on two principles, which usually do not contradict:
Maximizing democratic self-rule
Protecting human rights
In this case, supporting the status quo in Taiwan -- de facto independence, de jure ambiguity -- seems the most likely to align with people's desires, to avoid the authoritarianism of China, and avoid the atrocities of war.
(In contrast, Russia's annexation of Crimea -- whether it was the democratic desire of Crimeans or not -- caused thousands of war deaths, displaced millions, and extended Putin's illiberal leadership.)
In the abstract, I support Taiwanese independence -- but only if it can be achieved without war, and if most voters prefer that. Or: Taiwan isn't a country, but it probably should be.
Conclusions and shilling
In short: Most Taiwanese people support the status quo of de-facto independence and de-jure ambiguity. The largest socialist pundits on Earth, Hasan and Vaush, were mostly correct about this, but both inaccurately described the status quo.
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FYI you left a sentence incomplete - you wrote "Since Nixon's 1972 visit to China, the United States has upheld the "One China" policy, in which the ."
A couple grammatical errors in the article but still a solid yet digestible analysis